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[703] 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, OR, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF INSISTING THAT 
THE ENVIRONMENT IS EVERYBODY’S BUSINESS 
 
BY 
ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG  
Constitutional environmental law has become a recognized and 
institutionalized specialty within environmental law, an acknowledgement of 
the pervasive interactions between the U.S. Constitution and the federal 
environmental statutes that go well beyond the normal constitutional 
underpinnings of federal administrative law. This Article posits that 
constitutional environmental law is the result of Congress consciously 
deciding that environmental protection is everybody’s business—specifically, 
from Congress’s decisions that states should participate in rather than be 
preempted by federal environmental law, that private citizens and 
organizations should help to enforce the statutes, and that private land and 
water rights are necessary components of national environmental protection. 
Nevertheless, despite almost five decades of constitutional environmental 
litigation and scholarship, the federal courts had never recognized 
environmental rights within the U.S. Constitution until 2016, raising the 
possibility that constitutional environmental law may soon assume another 
dimension. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Somewhere in the early 2000s, constitutional environmental law became a 
thing—a recognized sub-specialty of environmental law practice and scholarship. 
The institutional signals of this fact are strong. The American Bar Association’s 
(ABA) Section on Environment, Energy, and Resources (SEER) has included a 
committee on Constitutional Law1 since 2005.2 The Constitutional Accountability 
Center considers environmental justice to be a core focal area.3 For the last thirteen 
years, the Environmental Law Institute in Washington, D.C., through the support of 
Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., has sponsored an annual law student writing 
competition on constitutional environmental law.4 Law schools advertise 
specializations in constitutional environmental law,5 and there are textbooks on 
constitutional environmental law.6 And, of course, there is constitutional 
environmental law scholarship—lots of it, including domestic7 and comparative8 
legal analyses as well as work in and about other countries.9 
 
 1  Constitutional Law Committee, AM. BAR. ASS’N., https://perma.cc/M982-LJ7A (last visited July 
13, 2019). 
 2  Author’s personal recollection, confirmed through communication with Professor James R. May, 
who petitioned SEER to create the committee. 
 3  Environmental Justice, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., https://perma.cc/Q54N-U9Z6 (last 
visited July 13, 2019). 
 4  ELI Constitutional Environmental Law Writing Competition, ENVTL. L. INST., 
https://perma.cc/Z69R-WAEG (last visited July 13, 2019). 
 5  See, e.g., Jim May, Constitutional Environmental Law, WIDENER ENVTL. L. CTR., 
https://perma.cc/R7ND-V5DY (last visited July 13, 2019) (providing examples of some institutions that 
offer certificates in environmental law). 
 6  See, e.g., JAMES R. MAY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (2011). 
 7  Bill Funk, of course, has been a contributor to this scholarship, including: William Funk, 
Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs: The Northeast Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 353, 354 (2009) 
[hereinafter Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2] (discussing environmental constitutional law 
issues pertaining to the regional northeast cap-and-trade program); William Funk, Justice Breyer and 
Environmental Law, 8 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 735, 735–36 (1995) (discussing Justice Breyer’s views 
on environmental law under the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction); William Funk, Reading Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 25 ENVTL. L. 127, 127 (1995) (discussing a case involving a regional city plan to 
develop a green area and bike path using the power of eminent domain); William Funk, Revolution or 
Restatement? Awaiting Answers to Lucas’ Unanswered Questions, 23 ENVTL. L. 891, 891 (1993) 
(discussing the potential impact of a U.S. case on environmental law in the United States); William 
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2019] CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 705 
Constitutional environmental law in many respects signals that environmental 
law is a different kind of federal regulatory law. Complexity is probably not the 
explanation. While environmental law can certainly be complicated, there are a 
number of other fairly complicated areas of federal statutory and regulatory law 
where the Constitution plays a fairly minimal role, especially outside the realm of 
enforcement and occasional preemption issues; drug safety regulation through the 
United States Food and Drug Administration and securities law under the Securities 
and Exchange Commission immediately suggest themselves. Notably, no other area 
of federal regulatory law appears to have an established subspecialty to address the 
constitutional issues that it raises. So, why has this subspecialty arisen for 
environmental law? 
This Article argues that one of the key differences between federal 
environmental law and other areas of federal regulatory law is that federal 
environmental law effectively makes environmental protection everybody’s 
business.10 Federal environmental statutes establish a suite of relationships between 
and among federal agencies, federal courts, state agencies, state courts, regulated 
entities, property owners, and general citizens, creating new issues of constitutional 
boundaries while at the same time incorporating all the constitutional issues that 
arise when citizens and regulated entities interact with federal agencies within 
classic administrative law procedures—rulemaking, licensing, and adjudication or 
enforcement. 
While the list of environmental law relationships is somewhat long, 
constitutional environmental law, as distinct from the routine constitutional aspects 
of administrative law, tends to emerge from three specific features of the federal 
statutes, which in turn provide the structuring of this Article. Part II explores the 
constitutional consequences of cooperative federalism, Congress’s deliberate 
decision to not only allow but actively encourage state involvement in 
implementing federal environmental requirements. As a result, federal 
environmental law has raised significant issues regarding the balance between 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and states’ Tenth Amendment rights, 
federal preemption, federal sovereign immunity from state regulation, the dormant 
Commerce Clause, and the Compact Clause. Part III, in turn, examines 
environmental citizen suits, Congress’s expansion of civil rights causes of action to 
allow individual citizens and private organizations help to enforce environmental 
 
Funk, Federal and State Superfunds: Cooperative Federalism or Federal Preemption, 16 ENVTL. L. 1, 
1–3 (1985) (discussing state and federal statutes that impact and address environmental justice). Other 
scholarly contributions are cited throughout this Article. 
 8  E.g., Roderic O’Gorman, Environmental Constitutionalism: A Comparative Study, 6 
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 435, 435–62 (2017) (discussing the phenomena of environmental laws being 
built into constitutions across the world). 
 9  E.g., Carl Bruch et al., Constitutional Environmental Law: Giving Force to Fundamental 
Principles in Africa, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 131, 132–33 (2001) (considering ways in which 
constitutional provisions in African countries may be used to further environmental law). 
 10  In many ways, this Article is the next step in my own constitutional environmental law 
scholarship and is indebted to both my 2004 (first edition) and 2009 (second edition) book, The Clean 
Water Act and the Constitution: Legal Structure and the Public’s Rights to a Clean and Healthy 
Environment (Environmental Law Institute Press) and the many articles on constitutional environmental 
law that I have written both before and after that book. 
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law requirements, creating a separate set of constitutional boundary issues. When 
citizens can bring enforcement actions in federal courts, they raise issues of states’ 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, federal sovereign immunity, and, above 
all, constitutional standing. Finally, environmental enforcement by governments 
against private entities not only raises classic constitutional issues common to all 
federal administrative enforcement, such as the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Seventh Amendment’s right to a 
jury trial, but also directly influences use of private property, creating recurring 
issues of constitutional takings. Part IV explores takings jurisprudence as it has 
played out across environmental statutes. 
As these Parts together make clear, federal environmental law practitioners 
and scholars must be well-versed in a wide range of constitutional law doctrines. 
The resulting weaving of statutory and constitutional legal issues created the 
tapestry now recognized as constitutional environmental law. This sub-discipline, 
moreover, stands poised to expand once again, as environmental plaintiffs once 
again are trying to convince the federal courts to recognize a fundamental right to a 
functional environment within the U.S. Constitution.11 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MESSINESS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
The United States protects its environment through a fairly comprehensive 
array of federal legislation—the National Environmental Policy Act of 196912 
(NEPA), the Clean Air Act13 (CAA), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
better known as the Clean Water Act14 (CWA), the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 197615 (RCRA), which amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
198016 (CERCLA), and many others. As a constitutional matter, it would have been 
fairly easy for Congress to expressly preempt state law, completely taking over 
these areas of environmental regulation. 
As constitutional issues go, express preemption under the Supremacy Clause17 
is a fairly easy analysis. Indeed, on the occasions when Congress has expressly 
preempted some aspect of state environmental regulation, the federal courts have 
generally had no problem displacing state law. For example, CERCLA expressly 
preempts state statutes of limitation—but not statutes of repose18—in favor of a 
 
 11 See generally Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1271–72 (D. Or. 2016) (discussed 
at the end of this Article). 
 12  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012).  
 13  Id. §§ 7401–7671q.  
 14  33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012).  
 15  42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012) (amending Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 
Stat. 992 (1965)).  
 16  Id. §§ 9601–9675.  
 17  The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
 18  CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2014). 
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federal discovery rule.19 The CWA expressly preempts state regulation of marine 
sanitation devices.20 Many of the federal environmental statutes expressly preempt 
states from imposing environmental requirements that would be less stringent than 
federal law.21 Perhaps most contentious has been the preemption provision in the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act22 (FIFRA), which expressly 
preempts state labeling or packaging requirements for pesticides,23 because it 
creates a fairly complex relationship between federal regulatory law and state tort 
law.24 
For the most part, however, Congress has chosen not to expressly preempt 
state regulation through its environmental statutes. Instead, it created structures of 
cooperative federalism.25 These statutory provisions define specific regulatory roles 
that Congress preferred states to play—setting water quality standards26 and issuing 
permits27 under the CWA, devising implementation plans to meet National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards under the CAA,28 management of non-hazardous 
solid waste under RCRA,29 coastal zone management under the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972,30 and many others. Sharing regulatory authority with the 
states, it turns out, is a whole lot messier, constitutionally, than express federal 
preemption.31 This Part explores five of the constitutional federalism issues that 
 
 19  42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(2) (2012). 
 20  33 U.S.C. § 1322(f)(1)(A), (n)(6)(A) (2012). 
 21  E.g., id. § 1370 (containing the CWA’s statement that a “[s]tate or political subdivision or 
interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, 
prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance which is less stringent that the effluent 
limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of 
performance under this chapter”). 
 22  7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012). 
 23  Id. § 136v(b). 
 24  Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 442–53 (2005) (holding that FIFRA did not 
preempt state-law tort claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, breach of 
express warranty, and violation of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), but that it might 
preempt state-law fraud and failure-to-warn claims); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 
606–10 (1991) (holding that FIFRA does not preempt local governmental regulation of pesticide use). 
 25  E.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1978) (characterizing the Reclamation Act 
of 1902 as a cooperative federalism statute); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 
(VSMRA) 452 U.S. 264, 288–89 (1981) (characterizing the Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act 
(SMCRA) as a cooperative federalism statute); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 767 (1982) (characterizing the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act as a cooperative 
federalism statute); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) (listing the CWA, 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, RCRA, and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
as cooperative federalism statutes) (citations omitted); Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 510–11, 537 (2014) (describing the CAA as a cooperative federalism 
statute). 
 26  33 U.S.C. § 1313(c), (d) (2012). 
 27  Id. §§ 1342(b), 1344(d). 
 28  42 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (2012).  
 29   Id. §§ 6941–6949a. 
 30  16 U.S.C. § 1454 (2012). 
 31  Environmental federalism has prompted significant amounts of scholarship—over 1,000 articles, 
according to Westlaw. For representative examples, see generally Erin Ryan, FEDERALISM AND THE 
TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2012); Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After Sebellius, 
85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1003 (2014); Brigham Daniels, Environmental Regulatory Nukes, 2013 UTAH L. 
REV. 1505 (2013); Robin Kundis Craig, Federalism Challenges to CERCLA: An Overview, 41 SW. L. 
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environmental cooperative federalism has raised: the balance between the 
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment; the tension between implied 
preemption and savings clauses with respect to the continued operation of state 
common law; federal sovereign immunity from state permitting and enforcement; 
the dormant Commerce Clause; and the Compact Clause. 
A. The Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment 
As the United States Supreme Court itself has noted, “the task of ascertaining 
the constitutional line between federal and state power has given rise to many of 
the Court’s most difficult and celebrated cases.”32 The Commerce Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment undergird much federalism litigation and have interacted 
frequently with federal environmental statutes.33 
The Commerce Clause states that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes.”34 The Framers intended the Commerce Clause to promote free 
trade among the states and thus render the United States a single commercial entity, 
but it also provides most of Congress’s authority to enact environmental statutes. 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence seeks to strike a balance between the states’ 
“reasonable exercise of [their] police powers over local affairs” and “matters of 
local concern” and the federal government’s power to oversee matters of “national 
interest[].”35 Thus, federal power over interstate commerce “‘may not be extended 
so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to 
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the 
 
REV. 617 (2012); Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719 (2006); Jonathan H. Adler, 
Judicial Federalism and the Future of Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005); Dean B. 
Suagee, Tribal Self-Determination and Environmental Federalism: Cultural Values as a Force for 
Sustainability, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 229 (1998); Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution of 
Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 265 (1997); Robert V. Percival, Environmental 
Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995). 
 32  New York, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992). 
 33  For discussions of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment and their relation to 
environmental law, see generally David M. Metres, Note, The National Impact Test: Applying 
Principled Commerce Clause Analysis to Federal Environmental Regulation, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1035 
(2010); Jennifer A. Maier, Comment, Outgrowing the Commerce Clause: Finding Endangered Species 
a Home in the Constitutional Framework, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 489 (2006); Mollie Lee, Note, 
Environmental Economics: A Market Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause, 116 YALE L.J. 456 
(2006); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003); 
Jamie Y. Tanabe, The Commerce Clause Pendulum: Will Federal Environmental Law Survive in the 
Post-SWANCC Epoch of “New Federalism”?, 31 ENVTL. L. 1051 (2001); Charles Tiefer, After 
Morrison, Can Congress Preserve Environmental Laws From Commerce Clause Challenges?, 30 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,888 (2000); Lydia B. Hoover, The Commerce Clause, Federalism and 
Environmentalism: At Odds After Olin?, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 735 (1997); Peter 
A. Lauricella, The Real “Contract with America”: The Original Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377 (1997); John P. Dwyer, The Commerce Clause and the Limits 
of Congressional Authority to Regulate the Environment, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,421 
(1995). 
 34  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 35  Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370–71 (1976). 
This content downloaded from 
            128.110.184.55 on Sat, 01 May 2021 15:44:49 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
FINAL.CRAIG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2019  2:10 PM 
2019] CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 709 
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely 
centralized government.’”36 
Balancing the Commerce Clause is the Tenth Amendment, which provides 
that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”37 The Tenth Amendment functions as the outer boundary of federal power 
and hence immediately raises questions of how far federal Commerce Clause 
authority can extend. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the close relationship 
between these two provisions in New York v. United States,38 noting that the 
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment analyses 
are mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Congress in the 
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power 
to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth 
Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on 
Congress.39 
Nevertheless, the relationship between these two constitutional provisions has 
evolved over time. Until 1937, Congress’ Commerce Clause authority was limited 
to regulating activities that directly affected interstate commerce.40 In 1937, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court began to accord the federal government much 
broader regulatory authority in decisions such as National Labor Relations Board 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. As the Court emphasized in that case, “[t]he 
congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens and 
obstructions . . . is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce ‘no 
matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it.’”41 Thus, according to the 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Court, Congress possessed expansive powers to regulate 
not only interstate commerce itself but also intrastate activities that affect interstate 
commerce.42 
This understanding of the Commerce Clause provided the constitutional law 
foundation for Congress when it began to enact the federal environmental statutes 
in the late 1960s. Congress had broad Commerce Clause authority, and if Congress 
wanted to induce state participation in federal regulatory programs, Congress could 
“‘attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds’” or “offer States the choice of 
regulating [an] activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-
empted by federal regulation,” but it could not “simply ‘commandee[r] the 
 
 36  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). 
 37  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 38  505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 39  Id. at 156. 
 40  See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (striking 
down statutes regulating allowable hours and wages because those issues were too remotely related to 
interstate commerce). 
 41  Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 36–37 (quoting Mandou v. New York, New Haven, & 
Hartford R.R. Co. (Second Employers’ Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912)). 
 42  Id. at 37. 
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legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce 
a federal regulatory program.’”43 
Congress stayed well within these constitutional boundaries in the federal 
environmental statutes. For example, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and 
Reclamation Ass’n (VSMRA), the Supreme Court upheld the federal Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 197744 (SMCRA) against allegations that it 
unconstitutionally intruded upon state regulatory authority.45 Notably, Congress 
had explicitly found that surface mining operations affected interstate commerce, 
by destroying or diminishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, 
recreational, agricultural, and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and landslides, by 
contributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats, 
by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards 
dangerous to life and property by degrading the quality of life in local communities, 
and by counteracting governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and 
other natural resources.46 
Moreover, “coal is a commodity that moves in interstate commerce,” and 
“nationwide ‘surface mining and reclamation standards are essential in order to 
insure that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in 
different States will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States to 
improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their 
borders.’”47 As a result, the SMCRA was constitutional.48 
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,49 the U.S. Supreme 
Court specifically distinguished environmental regulation from land use planning 
with respect to the Commerce Clause/Tenth Amendment balance, concluding that 
“[l]and use planning in essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental 
regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only 
that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed 
limits.”50 While land use planning is presumptively a state prerogative, 
environmental regulation clearly could be the subject of federal statute,51 and the 
VSMRA Court “agree[d] with the lower federal courts that have uniformly found 
the power conferred by the Commerce Clause broad enough to permit 
congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution . . . .”52 
For a time, therefore, the Commerce Clause/Tenth Amendment limitations on 
federal environmental law were functionally insignificant. However, in 1995, the 
 
 43  New York, 505 U.S. 144, 161,167 (1992) (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 
(1987); VSMRA, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
 44  30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1279 (2012). 
 45  VSMRA, 452 U.S. at 291. 
 46  Id. at 277 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c)). 
 47  Id. at 281–82 (quoting 30 U.S.C. §1201(g)). 
 48  Id. at 268.  
 49  480 U.S. 572 (1987). 
 50  Id. at 587. 
 51  See id. at 588. 
 52  VSMRA, 452 U.S. at 282. 
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2019] CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 711 
U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Lopez,53 revitalizing Commerce 
Clause challenges to the federal environmental statutes. In that case, the Court 
invalidated, on Commerce Clause grounds, the Gun Free School Zones Act of 
1990,54 in the process “identif[ying] three broad categories of activity that Congress 
may regulate under its commerce power.”55 “First, Congress may regulate the use 
of the channels of interstate commerce.”56 “Second, Congress is empowered to 
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons and 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
intrastate activities.”57 “Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power 
to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.”58 
Lopez inspired new constitutional challenges to many federal environmental 
statutes, especially those statutes, like the Endangered Species Act (ESA)59 and 
 
 53  514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Lopez decision inspired much commentary. Some of the discussions 
regarding its federalism implications include: Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism 
in Progressive Political Theory and the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 403 (2002); Bill Swinford & Eric N. Waltenburg, The Supreme Court and the States: Do 
Lopez and Printz Represent a Broader Pro-State Movement?, 14 J.L. & POL. 319 (1998); Julian Epstein, 
Evolving Spheres of Federalism After U.S. v. Lopez and Other Cases, 34 HARV. J. LEGIS. 525 (1997); 
Russell F. Pannier, Lopez and Federalism, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 71 (1996); Ann Althouse, 
Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793 (1996); Debbie Ellis, A Lopez 
Legacy?: The Federalism Debate Renewed, But Not Resolved, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 85 (1996); Rachel 
Elizabeth Smith, Note, United States v. Lopez: Reaffirming the Federal Commerce Power and 
Remembering Federalism, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1459 (1996); Michael J. Trapp, Note, A Small Step 
Towards Restoring the Balance of Federalism: A Limit to Federal Power Under the Commerce Clause 
United States v. Lopez, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471 (1996); Gregory W. O’Reilly & Robert Drizin, United 
States v. Lopez: Reinvigorating the Federal Balance by Maintaining the States’ Role as the “Immediate 
and Visible Guardians” of Security, 22 J. LEGIS. 1 (1996); Eric W. Hagen, Note, United States v. Lopez: 
Artificial Respiration for the Tenth Amendment, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1363 (1996); Anthony B. Ching, 
Travelling Down the Unsteady Path: United States v. Lopez, New York v. United States, and the Tenth 
Amendment, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 99 (1995). 
 54  18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. II 1994). 
 55  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. at 558–59. 
 59  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). See People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 1000–06 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 649 (2018); 
Markle Interests v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 827 F.3d 452, 475–78 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. granted and 
vacated on other grounds, 139 S. Ct. 590 (2018); San Luis & Delta–Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 
638 F.3d 1163, 1174–77 (9th Cir. 2011); Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 
1250, 1271–77 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1097 (2008); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 
F.3d 1062, 1064–76 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 636–41 (5th Cir. 
2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490–99 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 
130 F.3d 1041, 1046–57 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Shields v. Babbitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 638, 659–64 (W.D. Tex. 
2000), vacated sub nom. Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Schuele 
v. Norton, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 906–
08 (D.D.C. 1997) (all except Shields v. Babbitt upholding the ESA against post-Lopez Commerce Clause 
challenges); see also Christopher S. Turner, Gibbs v. Babbitt: The Vitality of Endangered Species 
Protection in the Lopez Era, 15 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 301, 301, 303 (2000–2001) (analyzing 
application of Lopez to ESA cases); Rob Strang, Note, Gibbs v. Babbitt: The Taking of Red Wolves on 
Private Land, A Post-Lopez Challenge to the Endangered Species Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 241 
(2000) (using post-Lopez cases to argue that Lopez gives the courts latitude to uphold regulation of 
activities that may not normally be considered interstate commerce); Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg 
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CERCLA,60 that can interfere with commercial development and land use. Nor 
have these challenges completely abated, and courts continue to debate whether and 
how the Commerce Clause limits the scope of federal environmental law, 
generating more constitutional environmental law in the process.61 Perhaps the 
longest-running controversy that can be directly traced to Lopez is the scope of the 
CWA’s “waters of the United States”62 and, hence, the scope of federal jurisdiction 
under the Act. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers,63 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit squarely 
teed up the post-Lopez Commerce Clause issue with respect to the CWA’s 
application to isolated waters used by migratory birds, finding Commerce Clause 
support for such jurisdiction.64 Although the U.S. Supreme Court decided its review 
on statutory, not constitutional, grounds, it refused to accord the Corps’ 
interpretation of “waters of the United States” Chevron deference because that 
interpretation threatened to violate the Commerce Clause and undermine the 
demands of federalism.65 According to the Court, the Migratory Bird Rule raised 
“significant constitutional questions,” because “[p]ermitting respondents to claim 
federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the ‘Migratory Bird 
Rule’ would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and 
primary power over land and water use.”66 Almost twenty years later, a 
constitutional cloud still hovers over the CWA, although the “waters of the United 
States” debate has taken on a legal life of its own, spurred by the Court’s fractured 
2006 decision in Rapanos v. United States,67 two controversial rulemakings,68 and a 
fairly dramatic change in presidential administration in 2017. 
Few constitutional environmental law scholars doubt that Congress could 
successfully establish and clarify its Commerce Clause authority over the 
constitutionally gray environmental regulatory issues remaining after Lopez. The 
question instead is whether it has. Lopez and its progeny create an expectation that 
Congress will justify its authority to enact statutes, and thus far Congress has 
generally been unwilling to amend the classic federal environmental statutes to 
make their constitutional grounding clearer. The absence of this key player in 
federal environmental law underscores the importance of a continuing dialogue 
 
to Stand On: The Treaty Power and Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After 
United States v. Lopez, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (1998) (arguing that the Commerce Clause does not 
give Congress the authority to support legislation as broad as the ESA). 
 60  Voggenthaler v. Md. Square LLC, 724 F.3d 1050, 1059–61 (9th Cir. 2013); Freier v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 200–03 (2nd Cir. 2002); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 
1506, 1509–11 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 61  See, e.g., Lighthouse Res. Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-05005-RJB, 2018 WL 5264334, at *6–8 
(W.D. Wash. 2018) (arguing that the denial of a § 401 certification under the CWA violated the 
Commerce Clause). 
 62  See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012). 
 63  191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 64  Id. at 850. 
 65  Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 172–74 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. 
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). 
 66  Id. at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)). 
 67  547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 68  Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,053 (Jun. 29, 
2015); Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4145 (Feb. 14, 2019). 
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between the courts and the legislature as constitutional jurisprudence evolves over 
time. 
B. Implied Preemption, Savings Clauses, and the Common Law 
Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress may implicitly preempt state law as 
well as expressly preempt it.69 This is the most complex kind of federal preemption 
analysis, in part because the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized several different 
pathways to implicit preemption, all of which focus upon Congress’s overall 
purpose in enacting the federal legislation. For example, “[t]he scheme of federal 
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress 
left no room for the States to supplement it,”70 a type of implicit preemption 
generally known as field preemption. For example, the Natural Gas Act of 1938,71 a 
“comprehensive scheme of federal regulation” that gives the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) “exclusive jurisdiction over the transportation and 
sale of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale,” embodies a congressional 
intent to occupy the field of interstate natural gas regulation because it gives FERC 
authority to regulate almost every aspect of natural gas transportation and sale.72 
Courts will also imply a congressional intent to preempt state law if “the Act of 
Congress . . . touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the 
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject.”73 Finally, courts will find implicit preemption if “the object sought to be 
obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it . . . 
reveal” Congress’s intent to preempt state law.74 
Implicit preemption tends to be rare in federal environmental law, however. 
Because Congress intended these statutes to work through cooperative federalism, 
many of their preemption-related provisions actually function as “saving clauses” 
that preserve states’ rights to regulate. For example, the CWA’s first section 
preserves “the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its 
jurisdiction” and specifies that nothing in the CWA “shall be construed to 
supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been established by 
any State.”75 The CWA thus distinguishes between water rights, which remain 
under state control, and water quality, which is the CWA’s subject.76 The 
 
 69  Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157–58, 167–68 (1978). 
 70  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm’n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942)); see 
also Ray, 435 U.S. at 157. 
 71  15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717w (2012). 
 72  See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300–04 (1988) (discussing the powers 
FERC is given to regulate). 
 73  Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941)); see also Ray, 435 
U.S. at 157. 
 74  Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing S. R.R. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 439, 446 (1915); Charleston 
& W.C. R.R. Co. v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597, 601–04 (1915); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 
U.S. 147, 149, 150, 153 (1917); Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)); see also 
Ray, 435 U.S. at 157–58. 
 75  33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2012). 
 76  Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012) (compare the water quality language of subsection (a) 
with the water quantity language of subsection (g)).  
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provisions of environmental statutes that prohibit states from enacting less stringent 
regulation also implicitly permit states to enact more stringent regulation than 
federal law requires.77 Environmental citizen suit provisions, discussed in more 
detail in Part II, almost universally preserve plaintiffs’ state-law causes of action 
rather than preempting them.78 
The savings provisions in the federal environmental statutes have allowed 
states to create large operating spaces of their own within environmental law. For 
example, California prohibits land disposal of biosolids through its Integrated 
Waste Management Act, and the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California has upheld this ban against claims that the CWA preempts 
such prohibitions—although the California Constitution might forbid them.79 The 
savings clauses in environmental citizen suit provisions generally leave state tort 
law fully in force to provide redress when pollution or other environmental mishaps 
harm persons or property. As one example, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia relied on the CWA’s savings clause to conclude that the 
CWA does not preempt state nuisance, trespass, or negligence claims in connection 
with the spraying or spreading of sewage sludge on land.80 
Nevertheless, not all implied preemption claims in environmental law fail. In 
particular, in areas where federal control is clearly dominant—such as is true for 
regulation of vessels on the ocean—courts will still preempt state law. Thus, when 
the State of Washington attempted to regulate oil tankers more stringently than 
federal law requires in an attempt to better protect itself from oil spills, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed the normal Supremacy Clause presumption of non-
preemption and narrowly construed the savings clauses in both the Ports and 
Waterways Safety Act81 and the Oil Pollution Act of 199082 (OPA) in order to 
“respect[] the established federal-state balance in matters of maritime commerce 
between the subjects as to which the States retain concurrent powers and those over 
which the federal authority displaces state control.”83 Washington was “regulat[ing] 
in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence,” and its 
laws were preempted.84 
Cooperative federalism and savings clauses, therefore, cannot completely 
eliminate the Supremacy Clause’s shadow, prompting new preemption challenges 
 
 77  U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 78  See infra Part II and accompanying discussion. For example, the CWA’s citizen suit provision 
emphasizes that “[n]othing . . . shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have 
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). 
 79  City of Los Angeles v. Cty. of Kern, 509 F. Supp. 2d 865, 894 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that 
“merely because the Clean Water Act does not preempt local bans on land application [of biosolids] 
does not mean that it expressly authorizes them despite state constitutional limitations to the contrary”). 
 80  Wyatt v. Sussex Surrey L.L.C., 482 F. Supp. 2d 740, 745–46 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 81  33 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (2012). 
 82  Id. § 2718. 
 83  See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000). 
 84  Id. at 106, 108. For more in-depth discussions of this case, see Paul S. Weiland, Preemption of 
Environmental Law: Is the U.S. Supreme Court Heading in the Wrong Direction?, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,579 (July 2000); see generally R. Brent Walton & Daniel J. Gunter, United States 
v. Locke: The Supreme Court Preempts States from Protecting Their Navigable Waters and Marine 
Resources From Oil Tanker Spills, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 37 (2000). 
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to test—successfully or unsuccessfully—the exact contours of the operating spaces 
that Congress has left for states. When Congress is not expressly clear about its 
intent to preempt—or conversely, its intent to preserve—state law, the U.S. 
Constitution thus remains a potential limit on state regulatory authority, promoting 
the continual creation of constitutional environmental law in ways that 
comprehensive displacement of state regulatory authority would not. 
C. Federal Sovereign Immunity and State Regulation of Federal Facilities 
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its 2009, 
and apparently last, report on federal facilities’ environmental compliance, 
the U.S. government owns and/or operates more than 42,000,000 acres of land with 
922,000 buildings, leases, and structures. Federal land ranges from forests, parks, and 
historic monuments to office buildings, hospitals, hydroelectric dams, and prisons. 
Operations from all types of federal facilities can generate pollution, create waste and 
impact the environment.85 
These federal facilities must comply with federal environmental laws, and, “[a]s of 
FY08, the EPA and states track[ed] more than 12,000 permits at nearly 11,000 
sites, including underground storage tanks, community water systems, and air 
emissions sources.”86 For example, under the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right to Know Act (EPCRA),87 265 federal facilities must report their releases of 
hazardous materials to the Toxics Release Inventory.88 
While the EPA often still takes the lead in enforcing federal environmental 
requirements against federal facilities,89 as states increasingly took over 
environmental permitting programs and enforcement authority, federal sovereign 
immunity in connection with these facilities became a serious constitutional issue. 
Sovereign immunity is a penumbral constitutional right of the United States, 
deriving from an English doctrine that “the King could do no wrong.”90 The federal 
courts have always required a plaintiff suing the federal government to demonstrate 
that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity and that the plaintiff’s 
case falls within that waiver.91 Only Congress can waive U.S. sovereign immunity92 
 
 85  OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE 2008 
STATE OF FEDERAL FACILITIES: AN OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AT FEDERAL 
FACILITIES 5 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 EPA FEDERAL FACILITIES REPORT]. 
 86  Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 12,088, § 1–102, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (Oct. 13, 1978) (requiring all 
federal facilities to comply “with applicable pollution control standards,” including those in the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, the CWA, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the CAA, the Noise Control Act, 
RCRA, and FIFRA). 
 87  42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2012). 
 88  See 2009 EPA FEDERAL FACILITIES REPORT, supra note 85, at 5. 
 89  See generally id.; Enforcement at Federal Facilities, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://perma.cc/E9KW-U5S4 (last updated July 13, 2018). 
 90  Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 171 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 91  See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Price v. United States, 174 U.S. 373, 
375–76 (1899) (“It is an axiom of our jurisprudence. The Government is not liable to suit unless it 
consents thereto, and its liability in suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute 
authorizing it.”); Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. 
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and it must do so unequivocally.93 In addition, “[C]ongress has an absolute 
discretion to specify the cases and contingencies in which the liability of the 
government is submitted to the courts for judicial determination.”94 As a result, the 
federal courts construe any waiver of sovereign immunity strictly and in favor of 
the United States.95 
Environmental sovereign immunity issues came to a head when states began 
to assume permitting authority under various federal statutes and then attempted to 
force federal facilities to obtain state permits. In general, the relevant waivers of 
sovereign immunity from state permitting requirements must come from the 
various environmental statutes’ federal facilities provisions.96 The U.S. Supreme 
Court addressed the federal sovereign immunity issue for state permitting in 1976 
in two companion cases—Hancock v. Train,97 which dealt with the CAA, and U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Resources 
Control Board,98 which dealt with the CWA. In both cases, the Court held that the 
relevant Act’s federal facilities provision was not specific enough to subject federal 
facilities to state permitting processes.99 However, Congress then amended those 
two provisions to make the waiver more explicit.100 
 
436, 444 (1834) (“As the United States are not suable of common right, the party who institutes such 
suit must bring his case within the authority of some act of congress, or the court cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over it.”); Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1997); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 789, 791–92 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997); Fostvedt 
v. United States, 978 F.2d 1201, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 988 (1993) (quoting 
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586)); McCarty v. 
United States, 929 F.2d 1085, 1087 (5th Cir. 1991); Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 
1380, 1385 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Comment, Of Fish, Federal Dams, and State 
Protections: A State’s Options Against the Federal Government for Dam-Related Fish Kills on the 
Columbia River, 26 ENVTL. L. 355, 369 (1996) (discussing the basic principles of sovereign immunity); 
Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383, 384 (1970) (discussing the 
role of the courts in sovereign immunity jurisprudence). 
 92  Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. Of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 280 (1983); Dalehite v. 
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1953); Presidential Gardens Assocs. v. United States ex rel. Sec’y of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., 175 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Millares Guiraldes de Tineo v. United 
States, 137 F.3d 715, 719 (2nd Cir. 1998)); Sprecher v. Graber, 716 F.2d 968, 973 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
 93  U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 
U.S. 535, 538–39 (1980)); Beamon, 125 F.3d at 967; Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 86 F.3d at 792; 
Alaska v. Babbitt, 38 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 
U.S. 30, 34 (1992)); Fostvedt, 978 F.2d at 1203 (citing United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)). 
 94  Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 166. 
 95  Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 601–02 (2005); U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 503 U.S. at 615 
(quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)); Block, 461 U.S. at 287; Babbitt, 38 F.3d at 
1072 (quoting Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. at 34); Fostvedt, 978 F.2d at 1202 (citing Ruckelshaus v. 
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983)); McCarty, 929 F.2d at 1087. 
 96  E.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2012); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2012); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6961 (2012). 
 97  426 U.S. 167, 168 (1976). 
 98  426 U.S. 200, 201–02 (1976). 
 99  Hancock, 426 U.S. at 198–99; California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 227–
28. 
 100  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No, 95-95, § 116, 91 Stat. 685, 711 (1977); Clean 
Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 60, 61(a), 91 Stat. 1566, 1597 (1977) (amending 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1323). 
This content downloaded from 
            128.110.184.55 on Sat, 01 May 2021 15:44:49 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
FINAL.CRAIG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2019  2:10 PM 
2019] CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 717 
The next issue was whether federal facilities could be held liable for state-
assessed civil penalties. In 1992, in U.S. Department of Energy v. Ohio, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided this issue in the context of both the CWA and RCRA, 
deciding once again that the waivers of sovereign immunity were not broad enough 
to subject federal facilities to state-issued (or indeed any) civil penalties.101 
Congress amended RCRA’s federal facilities provision to fix the problem,102 but it 
has not amended the CWA’s. 
The federal sovereign immunity doctrine thus challenges and, under many 
statutes, still limits states’ constitutional ability to become full-fledged 
environmental regulators. In particular, because Congress has to be exceptionally—
one might argue excessively—clear in drafting its waivers of federal sovereign 
immunity, assertions of state authority pursuant to the most natural readings of 
federal facilities provisions can still prompt constitutional challenges to that 
authority. Again, therefore, cooperative federalism generates constitutional 
environmental law. 
D. Dormant Commerce Clause 
Because the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause gives authority over 
interstate commerce to Congress, it also restricts the states from discriminating in 
trade or from enacting protectionist laws—the effects of the so-called dormant 
Commerce Clause.103 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Interstate 
Commerce Clause “has long been understood . . . to provide ‘protection from state 
legislation inimical to the national commerce [even] where Congress has not 
acted.’”104 In 2008, it emphasized that “[t]he modern law of what has come to be 
called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about ‘economic 
 
 101  U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 503 U.S. 607, 621–27 (1992). For more detailed discussions of this 
decision, see Mirth White, Can Congress Draft a Statute Which Forces Federal Facilities to Comply 
With Environmental Laws in Light of the Holding in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio?, 15 
WHITTIER L. REV. 203, 211–15 (1994); Daniel Horne, Note, Federal Facility Environmental 
Compliance After United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 631, 635–37 
(1994); Rebecca Heintz, Note, Federal Sovereign Immunity and Clean Water: A Supreme Misstep, 24 
ENVTL. L. 263, 264–65 (1994); Gregory J. May, U.S. Department of Energy v. Ohio and the Federal 
Facility Compliance Act of 1992: The Supreme Court Forces a Hazardous Compromise in CWA and 
RCRA Enforcement Against Federal Agencies, 4 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 363, 364–65 (1993); Karen M. 
Matson, Note, Waiver of Sovereign Immunity—Did Congress Intend to Exempt Federal Facilities From 
Civil Penalties Under the Clean Water Act? United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 
1627 (1992), 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 489, 489–90 (1993); Peter McKenna, States May Not Impose 
Civil Penalties on the U.S. Government for Violations of State Statutes Promulgated Under the 
Authority of the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 23 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 762, 775–77 (1993). 
 102  Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, § 102(a), (b), 106 Stat. 1505, 
1505–06 (Oct. 6, 1992) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 6961). 
 103  See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956–60 (1982) (groundwater); 
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 669–79 (1981) (trailer requirements for 
commercial trucking); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336–38 (1979) (transporting or shipping 
minnows) (all striking down state laws that burdened interstate commerce). 
 104  Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 310 (1994) (quoting S. Pac. Co. 
v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)). 
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protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic 
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.’”105 
With this principle as the touchstone, dormant Commerce Clause challenges 
are evaluated in two steps. First, if state legislation facially discriminates against 
interstate commerce, it is “virtually per se invalid.”106 The federal courts will 
uphold such a law “only if it ‘advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be 
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.’”107 Second, if a 
state law appears to regulate even-handedly but indirectly affects interstate 
commerce, it is evaluated under the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.108 balancing test. 
Under this test: 
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question 
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of 
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.109 
State laws are almost always constitutional under Pike balancing.110 
In environmental law, the dormant Commerce Clause has been especially 
important in the context of solid waste, which, as noted, RCRA generally leaves to 
the states. In a series of decisions spanning almost twenty years, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that waste disposal is a commercial or economic 
activity and thus that, under the dormant Commerce Clause, state and local 
governments cannot discriminate against out-of-state waste in their waste disposal 
plans.111 These decisions overturned virtually every attempt states made to 
 
 105  Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (quoting New Energy Co. of 
Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988)). 
 106  Id. at 338–39 (2008) (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 
99 (1994)); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–55 (1992); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. 
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 
(1978). 
 107  Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. at 338–39 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 100–01). 
 108  397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 109  Id. at 142 (citations omitted); see also Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. at 338–39 (reciting this 
same test). 
 110  But see Levy v. Rowland, 359 F. Supp. 2d 267, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (suggesting that the 
burdens on interstate commerce caused by Connecticut’s moratorium on transmission of electricity to 
New York via high-voltage fiber optic cables outweighed the alleged environmental benefits to 
Connecticut citizens of the moratorium). 
 111  See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) (holding that a 
town ordinance that required handling of solid waste at the town’s transfer station violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. at 108 (holding that 
Oregon violated the dormant Commerce Clause by imposing a $2.50 per ton surcharge on in-state 
disposal of waste generated out of the state); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. 
Res., 504 U.S. 353, 367–68 (1992) (holding that a Michigan statute that prohibited private landfill 
operators from accepting solid waste that originated outside of the county in which the landfill was 
located violated the dormant Commerce Clause); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 
346 (1992) (finding that an Alabama statute that imposed an additional fee on all hazardous wastes 
generated outside Alabama discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Constitution); 
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distinguish between in-state and out-of-state waste, despite the burdens—
economic, environmental, and in terms of land use—that importation of another 
state’s waste can impose on the receiving state’s landfills and other waste treatment 
facilities. Only in 2007, in United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid 
Waste Management Authority,112 did the Court give states a constitutional break, 
upholding local “flow control” ordinances that directed trash to government-owned 
waste processing facilities.113 Thus, somewhat perversely, in a cooperative 
federalism scheme designed specifically to encourage state participation, the 
dormant Commerce Clause constitutionally limits state creativity. 
The dormant Commerce Clause can also limit interstate creativity, as both 
Bill Funk and I were exploring almost simultaneously—he in the context of 
regional cap-and-trade programs for greenhouse gases,114 I in the context of 
multistate agreements and projects related to renewable energy.115 Bill identified 
two aspects of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) that could run afoul 
of the dormant Commerce Clause: offsets and leakage.116 With regard to offsets, 
the RGGI 
limits the location of offset projects to participating states or nonparticipating states 
whose regulatory agency has entered into a memorandum of understanding to carry 
out certain obligations, including auditing and enforcement of offset terms. By 
distinguishing between participating states and nonparticipating states, the Model 
Rule facially discriminates against interstate commerce in offsets. 117 
Hence, it would seem to violate the dormant Commerce Clause.118 Nevertheless, 
“the restriction is not protectionist in intent or effect,” and, pursuant to the Dean 
Milk Co. v. City of Madison119 line of cases, “reasonable attempts to provide 
equivalent out-of-state safeguards as are provided with respect to in-state entities 
are not discriminatory merely because they differ in certain ways or involve an 
added cost attributable to the difficulty of out-of-state enforcement.”120 
Leakage, in turn, arises “[b]ecause generators within RGGI must have 
allowances for their CO2 emissions, which will increase their costs,” incentivizing 
them “to import ‘dirty’ electricity rather than pay the higher price for ‘clean’ 
 
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (holding that a New Jersey statute that 
prohibited importation of most solid and liquid waste that originated or was collected outside of the state 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause). But see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 
456, 472 (1981) (upholding a Minnesota statute that banned the retail sale of milk in plastic, 
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers). 
 112  550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
 113  Id. at 334. 
 114  Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2, supra note 7, at 362–69. 
 115  Robin Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multistate 
Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 771, 792–96 (2010). 
 116  Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2, supra note 7, at 362–64. 
 117  Id. at 362. 
 118  Id. 
 119  340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
 120  Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2, supra note 7, at 362–63 (citing Dean Milk v. City 
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)). 
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electricity generated within the RGGI area.”121 One of the potential solutions to the 
leakage problem would be to ban electricity generated in non-RGGI states from the 
RGGI area,122 but “[t]his facial discrimination would almost surely violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause because it would impose the most extreme burden on 
interstate commerce (a ban) in order to achieve the local purpose.”123 Similarly, a 
“hybrid approach would require LSEs to obtain allowances for any power 
purchased from outside RGGI . . . [which] would also be facially discriminatory 
and could be upheld, if at all, only under the theory underlying the compensatory 
tax doctrine.”124 
The dormant Commerce Clause also dogs multistate arrangements regarding 
renewable energy. “A number of dormant Commerce Clause cases have involved 
energy production, and they systematically conclude that states cannot create legal 
requirements or preferences based on the source of the fuel or energy.”125 “Nor can 
states ‘hoard’ state-created energy within their borders.”126 As a result, 
multistate renewable energy arrangements could implicate the dormant Commerce 
Clause in a number of ways. Clearly, at the state level, [Renewable Portfolio 
Standard] requirements that favor in-state [Renewable Energy Credits] or forbid out-
of-state RECs could run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. Similarly, multistate 
agreements that allow REC trading within the consortium but prohibit RECs from 
other states could raise constitutional concerns. Finally, multistate arrangements that 
favor—either through RECs, transmission access, or taxes or other financial 
incentives—renewable energy produced in certain states and to disfavor renewable 
energy produced in others could raise dormant Commerce Clause concerns.127 
Thus, Bill Funk and I agree that creative multistate attempts to deal with climate 
change and to promote the decarbonization of the United States’ energy supply 
could fairly easily run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause, potentially 
thwarting first-best regulatory structures for dealing with this most pressing of 
environmental problems. 
E. The Compact Clause and Interstate Agreements 
If the dormant Commerce Clause can interfere with interstate creativity, the 
Compact Clause gives states a constitutional mechanism for pursuing new kinds of 
arrangements—so long as they have Congress’s blessing. The U.S. Constitution’s 
Interstate Compact Clause provides that: 
 
 121  Id. at 363. 
 122  See id. at 366. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. at 366 & n.57 (citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)) (“upholding 
Washington State’s use tax on imported goods to compensate for the State’s sales tax against a dormant 
commerce clause challenge”). 
 125  Craig, supra note 115, at 793. 
 126  Id. at 794. 
 127  Id. at 795. 
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No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep 
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with 
another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or 
in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.128 
As the italicized language indicates, the Interstate Compact Clause operates as an 
explicit restriction on state authority. States entering into any kind of environmental 
agreement among themselves need to consider whether Congress’s approval is 
necessary, because multistate agreements deemed interstate compacts for purposes 
of this clause are unconstitutional without such approval.129 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s first—but still guiding—statement about the 
applicability of the Interstate Compact Clause derives from the 1893 case of 
Virginia v. Tennessee.130 In this case, Virginia sought to void an 1802–1803 
agreement with Tennessee regarding the border between the two states on the 
grounds that the agreement was an interstate compact that Congress had not 
approved.131 The Court created a legal touchstone that interstate agreements need 
Congress’s approval when they “tend[] to the increase of political power in the 
States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United 
States.”132 Because states’ agreements regarding borders could encroach “upon the 
full and free exercise of Federal authority,” they require Congress’s consent.133 
In contrast, in 1985, the Supreme Court determined that Massachusetts and 
Connecticut had not formed an interstate compact when both enacted statutes that 
allowed regional but out-of-state bank holding companies to purchase banks and 
bank holding companies within each state’s borders.134 Whatever agreement existed 
did not infringe upon either federal supremacy or other states’ sovereignty, and 
hence Congress’s consent would not be required.135 Similarly, in 2002, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Master Settlement 
Agreement in the state tobacco litigation, which involved forty-six states and most 
of the major tobacco manufacturers, was not an interstate compact requiring 
Congress’s approval.136 As the court explained, while “the Master Settlement 
Agreement may result in an increase in bargaining power of the States vis-a-vis the 
tobacco manufacturers, . . . this increase in power does not interfere with federal 
supremacy because the Master Settlement Agreement ‘does not purport to authorize 
the member States to exercise any powers they could not exercise in its 
absence.’”137 “In addition, the Master Settlement Agreement does not derogate 
from the power of the federal government to regulate tobacco,” especially because 
 
 128  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
 129  West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27–28 (1951). 
 130  148 U.S. 503 (1893). 
 131  Id. at 517. 
 132  Id. at 519. 
 133  Id. at 520. 
 134  Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175–76 (1985). 
 135  See id. at 176. 
 136  See Star Sci., Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 345, 360 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 137  Id. at 360 (quoting U.S. Steel Corp v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978)). 
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the Master Settlement Agreement anticipated—and expressly subordinated itself 
to—any future federal statutes regulating tobacco.138 
In examining the constitutional implications of the RGGI, Bill Funk 
concluded that it did not need Congress’s consent as an interstate compact. 
Analogizing to the Multi-State Tax Commission at issue in U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Multistate Tax Commission,139 he concluded that: 
RGGI does not limit the federal government’s authority to regulate CO2 in any way it 
sees fit. Like the Commission, RGGI, Inc.—the entity created to support development 
and implementation of the RGGI program—does not impinge on federal supremacy. 
No state has delegated its sovereign powers to RGGI, Inc., nor can RGGI, Inc. 
exercise any powers over the states. It acts at most in a ministerial and advisory 
capacity, much like the Commission. All of RGGI’s actual powers stem solely from 
individual states’ laws, which—as was the case under the Compact—are “nothing 
more than reciprocal legislation” with no capacity to bind other member states. 
This similarity between RGGI and the Compact suggests that RGGI does not 
violate the Compact Clause because it lacks congressional consent.140 
In contrast, “[m]ost multistate cooperative agreements involving electricity have 
proceeded as interstate compacts” and probably need to, given the pervasiveness of 
federal regulation in this area.141 
However, even when congressionally approved interstate compacts are not 
required, congressional approval can confer constitutional benefits on the 
compacting states and their created regulatory regime. First, “the existence of an 
interstate compact affects the application of the Supremacy Clause and the federal 
preemption analysis. Interstate compacts approved by Congress become federal 
law, with the result that other federal statutes cannot automatically preempt a 
compact.”142 Second, “congressional approval of an interstate compact and its 
status as federal law insulates multistate programs from dormant Commerce Clause 
scrutiny.”143 As such, a congressionally approved interstate compact represents 
cooperative federalism at the multistate level, providing a constitutional mechanism 
for interstate creativity to accomplish aims that the U.S. Constitution might not 
otherwise allow. 
 
 138  Id. 
 139  434 U.S. 452, 456–57 (1978); see Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2, supra note 7, at 
358–60, for a discussion of the test used to determine when interstate compacts are valid without 
Congress’ approval.  
 140  Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2, supra note 7, at 360. I was less convinced. See 
Craig, supra note 115, at 820–22. The courts have not (yet) decided the issue. 
 141  Craig, supra note 115, at 819 (citing Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power & 
Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1363–66 (9th Cir. 1986); Safe Harbor Water Power 
Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 124 F.2d 800, 806–08 (3rd Cir. 1941)). 
 142  Id. at 827. 
 143  Id. at 828–29 (citing Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568, 
569–70 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
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III. CITIZEN SUITS AND THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION 
Environmental citizen suit provisions are in some ways Congress’s clearest 
statements that the environment is everybody’s business, because Congress allows 
private individuals and organizations to help ensure that regulated entities meet 
federal environmental requirements. Citizen suits first became important in 
connection with NEPA, which imposes duties—most notably the Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) requirement144—on federal agencies. Because NEPA 
apples to federal agencies, private individuals and entities can challenge federal 
agency compliance through the federal Administration Procedure Act’s145 (APA’s) 
judicial review provisions.146 
Beginning with the CAA in 1970,147 Congress expanded the rights of private 
enforcers beyond the APA by including citizen suit provisions in most of the 
federal environmental statutes.148 Although these provisions are all similar, the 
CWA’s is one of the most typical—and the most used. It provides that: 
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf— 
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other 
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh 
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent 
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator 
or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to 
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the 
Administrator. 
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in 
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or 
limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform any such act or 
duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 
1319(d) of this title.149 
 
 144  42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). 
 145  5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2012). 
 146  Id. §§ 701–706. 
 147  See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (the CAA’s citizen suit provision). 
 148  See Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 23 n.1 (1989) (listing the following statutes as 
having similar citizen suit provisions as that in RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012): Toxic Substances 
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2012); ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 
(2012); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012); Deepwater Port Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1515 (2012); Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1910 (2012); CWA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365 (2012); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012); Safe 
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j–8 (2012); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (2012); Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (2012); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9124 (2012); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2012); Emergency Planning and Community Right-
To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (2012); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 
U.S.C. § 1349 (2012); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976, 49 U.S.C. App. § 60121 
(2012)). 
 149  33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012). 
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724 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 49:3 
A “citizen” entitled to bring such actions is “a person or persons having an interest 
which is or may be adversely affected.”150 Civil penalties assessed in a citizen suit 
are payable to the U.S. Treasury; however, to encourage citizen suits, Congress 
made litigation costs, “including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees,” 
available to plaintiffs “whenever the court determines such award is 
appropriate.”151 
Citizen enforcement, it turns out, has significantly added to the effectiveness 
of environmental law. As Russell E. Train, the second Administrator of the EPA, 
observed, “[c]itizen concern and citizen action were key ingredients both of our 
nation’s rapid development of environmental protection policies and of the 
effective implementation of those policies.”152 “[M]any established citizen 
environmental organizations played an active and effective role, indeed a crucial 
one, in monitoring and promoting the enforcement of environmental laws, 
especially in the early 1970s during initial implementation of the EIS process in 
federal decision making.”153 In 2003, Professor James R. May estimated that 
citizens had filed over 2,000 environmental citizen suits since 1970,154 resulting in 
about 1,500 reported federal court decisions, which represented at that point 
“roughly 3 in 4 (75%) of all reported civil environmental decisions.”155 Between 
1995 and 2002, citizens were responsible for “315 compliance-forcing judicial 
consent orders[] under the CWA and CAA alone,”156 and “[d]uring the same 
period, under all environmental statutes, citizens . . . submitted more than 4,500 
notices of intent to sue,”157 about eight-ninths of which were directed at members 
of the regulated community and the rest directed at implementing agencies.158 
However, citizen suits also raise constitutional issues related to the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction to hear environmental lawsuits. For example, because citizen 
suit provisions allow private entities to sue governments, federal sovereign 
immunity and state Eleventh Amendment immunity become recurring issues.159 
Perhaps most importantly, however, environmental citizen suits test federal courts’ 
Article III jurisdiction over “cases and controversies” and have been the primary 
driver of federal court standing jurisprudence since the 1970s.160 
 
 150  Id. § 1365(g). 
 151  Id. § 1365(d). 
 152  RUSSELL E. TRAIN, POLITICS, POLLUTION, AND PANDAS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL MEMOIR 94 
(2003). 
 153  Id. at 95. 
 154  James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Environmental Citizen Suit Trends, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,704, 10,704 (2003). 
 155  Id. at 10,706. 
 156  James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2003). 
 157  Id. 
 158  See id. 
 159  See id. at 4, 11. 
 160  Id. at 7–8, 33–34. 
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A. Federal Sovereign Immunity in the Context of Citizen Suits 
As is true for state enforcement against federal facilities, when private citizens 
attempt to sue federal facilities and federal agencies, ordinary principles of federal 
sovereign immunity apply. Most environmental citizen suit provisions allow for at 
least some suits against at least some federal entities. Thus, for example, most 
citizen suit provisions in the federal pollution control statutes clearly waive the 
EPA’s sovereign immunity in suits to compel the Administrator to complete his or 
her nondiscretionary duties under the relevant statute.161 Most environmental 
citizen suit provisions also allow lawsuits against federal agencies that violate the 
relevant statute.162 
The exact wording of an environmental citizen suit provision is critical to the 
scope of its waiver of sovereign immunity. For example, despite the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in U.S. Department of Energy with respect to civil penalties under 
the CWA and RCRA, the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Tennessee nevertheless held that citizens could seek civil penalties against federal 
facilities under the CAA, distinguishing that statute’s language.163 The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of California, through somewhat 
contorted reasoning, held that although the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Army 
Corps’ or Corps’) violation of its Incidental Take Statement under the ESA would 
not fall within that Act’s citizen suit provision’s waiver of sovereign immunity, the 
Corps’ taking of protected fish without Statement protection violated the Act itself 
and hence did fall within the waiver of sovereign immunity.164 
Sovereign immunity challenges continue to block several kinds of citizen 
suits. The CWA’s citizen suit provision, for example, does not mention the Army 
Corps, one of the two federal agencies that implement the Act.165 As a result, the 
CWA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not extend to the Corps,166 just the 
EPA, and it does not allow citizens to seek civil penalties for federal facilities’ past 
violations of the Act.167 More generally, compliance with a citizen suit provision’s 
procedural requirements are part of the relevant waiver of sovereign immunity, and 
hence failure to comply with those requirements in a case against a federal 
 
 161  Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 850 F. Supp. 2d 300, 303 (D.D.C. 2012) (CAA); Sierra 
Club v. Johnson, 500 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940–41 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (CAA). 
 162  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1)–(2) 
(CAA); see also Sierra Club, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (CAA citizen suit against the EPA).  
 163  United States v. Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 967 F. Supp. 975, 978–82 (M.D. Tenn. 1997). 
But see Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337, 1353–56 (11th Cir. 2005); City of 
Jacksonville v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 348 F.3d 1307, 1314–20 (11th Cir. 2003) (both holding that the 
CAA did not waive federal sovereign immunity from punitive penalties). Notably, at least one court has 
held that the waiver of immunity for environmental suits against the TVA comes from other places. 
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1297–98 (M.D. Tenn. 2016). 
 164  S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131–35 
(E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 165  33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012). 
 166  Cascade Conservation League v. M.A. Segale, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 692, 696–98 (W.D. Wash. 
1996); All. to Save the Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2007); 
Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1120 (D. Or. 2000). 
 167  Sierra Club v. Lujan, 972 F.2d 312, 316 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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defendant gives rise to a sovereign immunity defense.168 In addition, the issue of 
whether a federal agency has a nondiscretionary duty or not can be critical to 
whether Congress has waived its sovereign immunity from suit.169 As such, federal 
sovereign immunity serves to preclude some citizen enforcement of federal 
environmental law, limiting full citizen participation in enforcement. 
B. State Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
As is true in the CWA language quoted in the introduction to this Part, most 
environmental citizen suit provisions allow citizen-plaintiffs to sue states for 
violations of the federal environmental statutes, so long as such lawsuits are 
consistent with the Eleventh Amendment.170 That Amendment provides that “[t]he 
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”171 On its 
face, the Eleventh Amendment only bars suits brought in federal court against a 
state by citizens of another state or of a foreign country.172 However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has long interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as also barring suits 
in federal court by citizens against their own state.173 However, the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar suits by the federal government against states in federal 
court174 (allowing, in the environmental law context, federal enforcement against 
states), nor does it address the issue of states’ vulnerability to suit in their own 
courts, which is a matter of state sovereign immunity law.175 
 
 168  See Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. McCarthy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 280, 287–88 (D.D.C. 2016); Envtl. 
Integrity Project v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 160 F. Supp. 3d 50, 62 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 169  Sierra Club v. Wheeler, 330 F. Supp. 3d 407, 417–21 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that the CAA’s 
citizen suit provision does not waive sovereign immunity in lawsuits about discretionary actions); 
Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 934 F. Supp. 2d 40, 48–49 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that 
the EPA does not have a mandatory duty to make a determination as to whether lead emissions from 
general aviation aircraft engines using aviation gasoline endangered the public health or welfare under 
the CAA, and hence that the Act does not waive its sovereign immunity from suit); Am. Rd. & Transp. 
Builders Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 865 F. Supp. 2d 72, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that there 
was no waiver of sovereign immunity to review the EPA’s CAA nonroad preemption rules); United 
States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 309, 332 (D.N.J. 2009) (holding that CERCLA’s citizen 
suit provision does not waive the EPA’s sovereign immunity if there is no nondiscretionary duty at 
issue). 
 170  See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 171  U.S. CONST., amend. XI. 
 172  Id. 
 173  See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144–46 (1993). 
 174  See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (citing Employees v. Mo. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285–86 (1973)); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140–
41 (1965); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934); Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n v. Bd. of Supervisors for the Univ. of. La. Sys., 559 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009); Chao v. Va. 
Dep’t of Transp., 291 F.3d 276, 280 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 175  E.g., Texas Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Bonser-Lain, 438 S.W.3d 887, 892–95 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2014) (deciding that the Texas Water Code did not waive the TCEQ’s sovereign immunity regarding 
greenhouse gas regulation); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dept. Envtl. Res., 604 A.2d 1177, 
1180–81 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (concluding that Pennsylvania’s Clean Streams Law waived the 
Department’s sovereign immunity). 
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The Eleventh Amendment preserves states’ sovereign immunity.176 However, 
because under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause federal law can displace 
state law, it is sometimes possible for Congress to abrogate states’ Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity. Congress has most clearly exercised this power 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,177 which was added to the Constitution 
after the Civil War. However, in 1996, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress could not abrogate states’ Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity through the Indian Commerce Clause,178 which 
also eliminated abrogation through the Interstate Commerce Clause,179 the basis of 
most of the federal environmental statutes. As a result, environmental citizen suits 
against states or state agencies in federal court must either find a waiver of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity or make use of an exception,180 such as the Ex 
parte Young doctrine.181 Otherwise, the suit is barred.182 
Like federal sovereign immunity, therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity 
can limit citizen enforcement of the federal environmental statutes.183 However, it 
is also important to remember that citizens may have an alternative option to file an 
environmental lawsuit against a state in the state courts,184 an option that does not 
exist for citizen suits against the federal government.185 
C. Standing 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution gives federal courts the power to hear only 
“Cases” or “Controversies.”186 Thus, as a constitutional matter, federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction. The standing requirement helps these courts to 
comply with this limitation by requiring that the plaintiff have a real and personal 
stake in the outcome of the litigation.187 Because standing is a matter of 
 
 176  United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 140. 
 177  Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59–60 (1996) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 
U.S. 445, 455 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment)). 
 178  See id. at 72–73. 
 179  Id. 
 180  See Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 292–97 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
N.Y. State Thruway Authority was not a state agency under the “arm of the state” analysis). 
 181  In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eleventh 
Amendment permitted suits against state officers, rather than against the state itself, so long as the 
plaintiff sought only prospective (injunctive) relief. This exception has applied in several environmental 
citizen suits. See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 307–09 (5th Cir. 2001) (allowing a RCRA 
citizen claim against a state official for injunctive relief). 
 182  See Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56–60 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing a CERCLA citizen 
suit); Martaugh v. New York, 810 F. Supp. 2d 446, 470 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing CWA, RCRA, and 
CERCLA claims). 
 183  Martaugh, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 470. 
 184  E.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. State ex rel. Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563, 566–70, 573–
74 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing that the State of Oregon could be hauled into state court for ESA-
related constitutional takings claims, but holding that this particular claim was not yet ripe). 
 185  Federal sovereign immunity still applies in state court. E.g., O’Neal v. Dep’t of the Army of the 
U.S., 742 A.2d 1095, 1099–1101 (Pa. Super. 1999) (dismissing a CERCLA claim against the United 
States on sovereign immunity grounds). 
 186  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 187  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).  
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constitutional jurisdiction, moreover, failure to meet the standing requirement 
results in dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit.188 
The citizen suit provisions in federal environmental statutes and Section 702 
of the federal APA potentially allow “random” unrelated third parties with no 
direct stake in the litigation—any person or any citizen—to sue federal agencies 
and regulated entities for violations of federal environmental laws, raising standing 
concerns.189 The U.S. Supreme Court began addressing constitutional 
environmental standing in 1972, in Sierra Club v. Morton.190 In that case, it 
concluded that the Constitution allowed neither “public interest” standing191 nor 
standing based on the interest of the natural resource itself.192 Instead, the plaintiff 
or its members must be directly injured by the action being challenged.193 The 
Court further refined standing jurisprudence in its 1992 decision in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife,194 articulating the three-element “irreducible constitutional 
minimum”195 test that continues to control citizen access to the federal courts. 
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or 
imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical”‘ . . . .”196 “Second, there must be a 
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury 
has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the 
court.’”197 “Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the 
injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”198 
Environmental citizen suits and environmental lawsuits pursuant to the APA 
have created a significant and not always wholly reconcilable body of 
constitutional environmental law,199 prompting an equally significant body of 
 
 188  See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  
 189  5 U.S.C. § 702 (1946); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012). 
 190  405 U.S. 727, 734–41 (1972). 
 191  Id. at 739–40. 
 192  See id. at 741–44 (Douglas J., dissenting) (arguing in dissent that organizations like the Sierra 
Club should be able to speak on behalf of endangered places and resources). Relatedly, species lack 
standing to sue in their own right, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed an 
Endangered Species Act case because the named plaintiffs—the cetacean community, a group of 
whales—lacked standing under both the Endangered Species Act and the APA. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 
386 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 193  Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739. 
 194  504 U.S. 555, 558 (1992). 
 195  Id. at 560–61. 
 196  Id. (quoting and citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41, n. 16 (1972); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983))). 
 197  Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). 
 198  Id. at 561 (quoting E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 38). 
 199  In just the U.S. Supreme Court, the environmental standing decisions since Sierra Club v. 
Morton include: Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 368 n.1 (2018) 
(Endangered Species Act); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 
U.S. 209, 224–28 (2012) (APA); Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011) 
(Clean Air Act); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149–156 (2010) (NEPA); 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–501 (2009) (APA challenge to Forest Service 
regulations); Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516–26 (2007) (Clean Air Act); 
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standing scholarship.200 However, standing jurisprudence also imposes basic 
cognitive framings on how the environment can exist within the law. Specifically, 
the federal court standing decisions test and articulate the kinds of interests in the 
environment that can find voice in the federal courts, which now range from 
aesthetic and recreational interests to economic and property interests.201 Since 
Sierra Club v. Morton, however, environmental standing doctrine effectively forces 
environmental plaintiffs to frame environmental issues in terms of personal, 
concrete, and immediate anthropocentric values, eliding the public interest in and 
benefits resulting from basic protection of general ecosystem health and 
function.202 Instead, particular environmental amenities must be valuable to a 
specific someone who is willing to go to court to protect them. While such persons 
are often easy to find, their absence means that public environmental values may 
never get their day in court. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS CLAIMS ARISING BECAUSE THE “ENVIRONMENT” 
INCLUDES PRIVATE PROPERTY 
Federal environmental law is applied administrative law, and, as a result, it 
can raise all of the general constitutional issues that all federal administrative 
regimes can raise. These include individual constitutional rights and civil liberties, 
 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–88 (2000) (Clean 
Water Act); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 161–66 (1997) (prudential standing under the Endangered 
Species Act and APA); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (1992) (Endangered Species Act); 
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882–83 (1990) (APA action about overseas injuries to 
species); Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1981) 
(Clean Water Act and Marine Protection, Research, & Sanctuaries Act); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 
U.S. 725, 735–39 (1981) (natural gas tax); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 683–90 (1973) (NEPA). 
 200  Westlaw calls up well over 2,000 law review articles with “standing” in the title. For a 
representative range of environmental standing scholarship, see generally, Alexander Tom, Note, 
Standing in a Federal Agency’s Shoes: Should Third-Party Action Affect Redressability under the 
National Environmental Policy Act?, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 337 (2016); Dru Stevenson & Sonny Eckhart, 
Standing as Channeling in the Administrative Age, 53 BOSTON COL. L. REV. 1357 (2012); Christopher 
Warshaw & Gregory E. Wannier, Business as Usual? Analyzing the Development of Environmental 
Standing Doctrine Since 1976, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 289 (2011); Bradford Mank, Revisiting the 
Lyons Den: Summers v. Earth Island Institute’s Misuse of Lyons’s “Realistic Threat” of Harm Standing 
Test, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837 (2010); Bradford Mank, Standing in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: 
Using Economic Injury as a Basis for Standing When Environmental Harm Is Difficult to Prove, 115 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 307 (2010); Oliver A. Houck, Standing on the Wrong Foot: A Case for Equal 
Protection, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, Removing “the Cloak of a Standing 
Inquiry”: Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 149 (2007); Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Meyers, Broadening the Scope of 
Environmental Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury in Fact After Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 345 (1994); Jeffery W. Ring & Andrew F. Behrend, Using 
Plaintiff Motivation to Limit Standing: An Inappropriate Attempt to Short-Circuit Environmental Citizen 
Suits, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 345 (1993); Bruce B. Varney & George J. Ward, Jr., Who Can Stand Up 
for the Environment? Standing to Challenge Administrative Agency Actions, 7 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL 
COMMENT 443 (1991); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972). 
 201  See Abate & Myers, supra note 200, at 357–58, 379. 
 202  Id. at 732, 740. 
This content downloaded from 
            128.110.184.55 on Sat, 01 May 2021 15:44:49 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
FINAL.CRAIG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2019  2:10 PM 
730 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 49:3 
especially in the enforcement context. Thus, for example, federal environmental 
enforcement has contributed to Fourth Amendment “administrative search” 
jurisprudence203 and provided the first prompt to the U.S. Supreme Court to define 
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in the context of federal regulatory 
requirements.204 
Unlike most federal regulatory regimes, however, environmental law routinely 
incorporates private property to fulfill its goals. Private land provides habitat for 
endangered and threatened species,205 while water rights can interfere with the 
needs of aquatic species, especially in the West during drought.206 The filling of 
wetlands on private land can also eliminate important habitat as well as degrade 
water quality.207 Building along the coast may have to be limited in light of coastal 
erosion, sea-level rise, and other coastal hazards.208 Water quality protection may 
require temporary moratoria on new development to bring runoff under control.209 
As was true for standing jurisprudence, federal environmental law (especially 
in combination with environment-related land use law) has provided the occasions 
to develop a substantial proportion of federal regulatory takings jurisprudence.210 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes that the United States 
shall not take “private property . . . for public use, without just compensation.”211 
This prohibition applies to the state and local governments by way of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.212 For most of U.S. history, the 
“takings” clause applied to the government’s physical occupation of real 
property.213 In 1922, however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that governments 
could also effect unconstitutional takings of private property through regulation.214 
Under the test that the Court eventually announced, courts evaluating a regulatory 
 
 203  See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229, 234–39 (1986) (upholding the 
EPA’s use of aerial photography in CAA enforcement against a Fourth Amendment challenge). 
 204  Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–20, 427 (1987) (holding that enforcement actions under 
the CWA for penalties require a jury trial). 
 205  See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 206  See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 207  See, e.g., Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 208  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008–09, 1019 (1992) (holding that when 
coastal building restrictions deprive a property owner of all economic use of the property, “there are 
good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called 
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his 
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking”). 
 209  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 308, 321–24 
(2002). 
 210  Beckett G. Cantley, Environmental Preservation and the Fifth Amendment: The Use and Limits 
of Conservation Easements by Regulatory Taking and Eminent Domain, 20 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 215, 217–18 (2014). 
 211  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 212  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1994); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481 n.10 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
122 (1978); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). 
 213  Josh Patashnik, Physical Takings, Regulatory Takings, and Water Rights, 51 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 365, 365 (2011) (discussing how traditional takings were seen as a physical appropriation of real 
property that carried a “categorical duty to compensate” the landowner). 
 214  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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taking claim balance three factors.215 First, “[t]he economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, [second], the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations.”216 The effect on actual property rights is critical, and no taking 
would be found if the plaintiff did not have a cognizable property interest at 
stake.217 Finally, the “character of the governmental action” is also important, with 
the explanation that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference 
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than 
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”218 As such, the Court has 
generally upheld land use and zoning regulations,219 but “government actions that 
may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely 
public functions have often been held to constitute ‘takings.’”220 
While the regulatory takings doctrine has had a complex history in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, it potentially limits any environmental regulatory scheme that can 
interfere with private land use.221 Section 404 of the CWA,222 which requires 
 
 215  Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (discussing factors that are involved in the court’s fact-
based inquiry on takings). 
 216  Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). 
 217  See id. at 124–25 (citing United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 511 (1945)); 
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 60 (1913); Demorest v. City Bank 
Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944); Muhlker v. Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 552 (1905); Joseph L. Sax, 
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61 (1964) (discussing the “multitude of existing 
interests” associated with property). 
 218  Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 270–71 
(1946)). 
 219  Id. at 125–26 (citing Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 
U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 592–93; Eastlake v. 
Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.8 (1976); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)). 
 220  Id. at 128. 
 221  For discussions of regulatory takings in the environmental law context, see John D. Echeverria & 
Michael C. Blumm, Horne v. Department of Agriculture: Expanding per se Takings While Endorsing 
State Sovereign Ownership of Wildlife, 75 MD. L. REV. 657, 658 (2016) (discussing regulatory takings 
in the context of wildlife regulation under the ESA); Richard J. Roddewig & W. James Hughes, 
Underbalanced Drilling: Can it Solve the Economic, Environmental and Regulatory Taking Problems 
Associated with Fracking?, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 511, 527–28 (2015) (discussing the controversial 
regulations on land use for fracking); Cantley, supra note 210, at 223; Robin Kundis Craig, Using a 
Public Health Perspective to Insulate Land-Use Related Coastal Climate Change Adaptation Measures 
from Constitutional Takings Challenges, 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 4, 4 (2014) (discussing a 2010 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision which held that a Florida beach project did not amount to an unconstitutional 
regulatory taking); Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too Many, 64 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2012) (discussing the various levels of protection against government 
activity that are given to differing land uses); Robin Kundis Craig, Defining Riparian Rights as 
“Property” Through Takings Litigation: Is There a Property Right to Environmental Quality?, 42 
ENVTL. L. 115, 131–32 (2012) (discussing environmental regulation’s impacts on riparian rights); 
Patashnik, supra note 213, at 366 (discussing the importance of the Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in takings jurisprudence); Michael C. Blumm & J.B. Ruhl, Background 
Principles, Takings, and Libertarian Property: A Response to Professor Huffman, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
805, 816–19 (2010) (providing insight into background principles used in takings analyses); James L. 
Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years after Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 
4–5 (2008); James L. Huffman, Beware of Greens in Praise of the Common Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 813, 816 (2008) (discussing environmental regulatory takings in light of recent U.S. Supreme 
This content downloaded from 
            128.110.184.55 on Sat, 01 May 2021 15:44:49 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
FINAL.CRAIG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2019  2:10 PM 
732 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 49:3 
permits when people dredge or fill waters on private property,223 and the ESA’s 
critical habitat224 and species take prohibitions225 have been particularly productive 
at generating constitutional takings cases.226 
Regulatory takings claims nevertheless remain difficult to prove, and in the 
environmental law context the courts have articulated several ameliorating 
principles of law. For example, “[o]nly when a permit is denied and the effect of 
the denial is to prevent ‘economically viable’ use of the land in question can it be 
said that a taking has occurred.”227 Under this rule, the Army Corps’ designation of 
property as wetlands subject to CWA regulation does not constitute a “taking,” 
regardless of whether the designation immediately affects the property’s value.228 
In addition, the courts apply a “whole parcel” rule, under which they evaluate loss 
of value against the entire legal parcel at issue, not just the part where development 
 
Court precedent); Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Partial Regulatory Takings: Stifling Community 
Participation Under the Guise of Kelo Reform, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 60 (2007) (discussing 
government interference of property in the Kelo U.S. Supreme Court decision); Michael C. Blumm & 
Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings 
Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 322 (2005) (discussing the importance of the Lucas decision in 
regulatory takings jurisprudence); Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings, Public Use, and Just 
Compensation After Brown, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,807 (2003); J. David Breemer, Of 
Nominal Value: The Impact of Tahoe-Sierra on Lucas and the Fundamental Right to Use Private 
Property, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,331 (2003); Michael C. Blumm, Palazzolo and the 
Decline of Justice Scalia’s Categorical Takings Doctrine, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 137 139–40 
(2002); David K. Brooks, Regulatory Takings—Where Environmental Protection and Private Property 
Collide, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 10, 10 (2002); Courtney Harrington, Penn Central to Palazzolo: 
Regulatory Takings Decisions and Their Implications for the Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 383 384–86 (2002); Nicholas J. Johnson, Regulatory Takings and Environmental 
Regulatory Evolution: Toward a Macro Perspective, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 557, 558–59 (1995); 
James L. Huffman, A Coherent Takings Theory at Last: Comments on Richard Epstein’s “Takings: 
Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain”, 17 ENVTL. L. 153 (1986). 
 222  33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). 
 223  Id. 
 224  16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2012). 
 225  Id. § 1538(a). 
 226  For § 404 of the CWA, see generally for example Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1299–
1300 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 455, 457 (2009); Norman v. 
United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 233 (2004); Pax Christi Mem’l Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. 
Cl. 318, 319 (2002); Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 786 (1989). For the ESA, see generally 
for example Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1279–82 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Gordon v. Norton, 322 F.3d 1213, 2015 (10th Cir. 2003); Boise Cascade Corp., 296 F.3d at 1341; 
Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 654, 659, 666 (2018); Klamath Irrigation v. United 
States, 129 Fed. Cl. 722, 724–25 (2016); Doyle v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 147, 149 (2016). 
 227  United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985); see also Cooley, 324 
F.3d at 1301–04 (holding that a taking claim was ripe if the Corps issued a final permit decision, even if 
the Corps later reconsidered that decision); Rybachek v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 904 F.2d 1276, 1300 
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a “takings” claim was not ripe when EPA had not yet applied its 
regulations to the parcel in question); Moore v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 603, 611–12 (E.D. Va. 1996) 
(holding that a “takings” claim was not ripe until there was a permit denial); United States v. Robinson, 
570 F. Supp. 1157, 1166 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (“As defendants have never had a permit denied, their taking 
claim is not ripe for judicial relief.” (citing United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1211 (7th Cir. 1979)); 
see Robert Meltz, Wetlands Regulation and the Law of Regulatory Taking, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
Law Inst.) 10468 (Jun. 2000). 
 228  Robbins v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 381, 385–86 (1998). 
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cannot occur.229 Relatedly, mere diminution in value is not enough to prove a 
regulatory taking.230 Finally, the existence of a federal regulatory scheme prior to 
purchase is relevant in evaluating the reasonableness of the property owner’s 
investment-backed expectations.231 
As a matter of adjudicated reality, the Takings Clauses have imposed only 
limited checks on environmental law. Takings jurisprudence, however, creates 
hesitations in governments contemplating new regulation—an unwillingness to 
exercise their full constitutional authority with respect to private property out of 
fear of expensive litigation, public backlash, or both. For example, only two states 
have taken on section 404 permitting authority under the CWA, in part because of 
the fears of takings liability from regulating the dredging and filling of wetlands 
and other waters232—activities generally associated with construction. 
Jurisprudential complexity (one might even say confusion) in specific subsets of 
takings cases, such as permit conditions/exactions or water rights, only increase the 
regulatory hesitation. While the “proper” balance between private rights and public 
needs is of course always subject to debate, the regulatory takings doctrine has 
contributed disproportionately to constitutional environmental law compared to its 
actual legal impact. 
V. CONCLUSION: WILL THERE BE A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
RIGHT? 
Despite the breadth and pervasiveness of constitutional environmental law, the 
U.S. Constitution itself provides no environmental rights.233 Indeed, it does not 
even mention the environment. Moreover, although many other countries have 
found a penumbral constitutional environmental right in various constitutional 
protections such as the right to life,234 the history of constitutional environmental 
 
 229  Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Formanek, 18 
Cl. Ct. at 794–95 (holding that the “taking” claim applied to the whole parcel when the Corps 
recognized throughout the permitting process that the plaintiff’s development project involved the entire 
parcel, not just the wetlands). But see Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 164–65 (1985), 
aff’d, 791 F.2d 893, 904–05 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987) (holding that the 
relevant property for the “taking” analysis was the nighty-eight acres out of 1,560 acres involved in the 
permit denial, even though the claimant eventually intended to mine the whole property). 
 230  See Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1213–14 (Fed. Cir. 1981); Deltona Corp. v. United 
States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1017 (1982); 1902 Atl. Ltd. v. 
Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381, 1404–05 (E.D. Va. 1983); Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 267, 
272 (finding no “taking” despite a 59.8% diminution in value); Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1166 (citing 
Deltona Corp., 657 F.2d at 1193). 
 231  E.g., Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 154, 156–57 (1999); Brace v. 
United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 282–83 (2000) (both holding that the claimant’s investment-backed 
expectations were mitigated by his being on notice of the CWA’s requirements). 
 232  State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://perma.cc/89F9-HJD8 (last visited July 13, 2019).  
 233  Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d 1041, 1065–66 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 234  Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy Environment?, 
34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,013, 11,018 (2004). 
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jurisprudence in the United States stands squarely against the finding of such a 
right within the U.S. Constitution.235 
First, federal judges emphasize the U.S. Constitution’s failure to mention the 
environment whenever plaintiffs have suggested that the federal courts should 
recognize a penumbral constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment,236 
which plaintiffs have done since at least 1971 through a variety of strategies.237 
Second, decades of attempts to extend the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to life,238 the Ninth Amendment protection of other fundamental rights,239 Fifth240 
and Fourteenth241 Amendment Due Process, and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection242 to the environment had—at least until 2016243—universally 
failed. In 1971, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
dismissively refused to recognize a constitutional right to environmental protection 
to reinforce the newly enacted NEPA, concluding that “[w]hile a growing number 
of commentators argue in support of a constitutional protection for the 
environment, this newly-advanced constitutional doctrine has not yet been 
accorded judicial sanction; and appellants do not present a convincing case for 
doing so.”244 Over two decades later, and despite dozens of intervening cases, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit could with even more 
assurance conclude that citizens of the United States do not “have a fundamental 
 
 235  I first discussed the issue of a constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment in 2003 and 
2004. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL STRUCTURE 
AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 238–259 (2004); see Craig, supra 
note 234, at 11,013, 11,018. The discussion here both updates and recasts that earlier work. 
 236  See, e.g., National Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Commerce Clause empowers Congress ‘to regulate commerce’ not ‘ecosystems.’ The Framers of the 
Constitution extended that power to Congress, concededly without knowing the word ‘ecosystems,’ but 
certainly knowing as much about the dependence of humans on other species and each of them on the 
land as any ecologist today. An ecosystem is an ecosystem, and commerce is commerce.”). 
 237  Craig, supra note 234, at 11,020–21. 
 238  See Gasper v. La. Stadium & Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897, 898–99 (5th Cir. 1978); In re 
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928, 933–34 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Fed. Emps. for Non-
Smokers’ Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181, 184–85 (D.D.C. 1978); Gasper v. La. Stadium & 
Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 718–21 (E.D. La. 1976). 
 239  Concerned Citizens of Neb. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 970 F.2d 421, 426–27 (8th Cir. 
1992); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. at 933–34; Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 721–
22; Pinkney v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305, 309–10 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Hagedorn v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1064–65 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); James River & Kanawha Canal 
Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metro. Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611, 640–41 (E.D. Va. 1973); Tanner v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs of U.S. 
Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
 240  In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. at 933–34; Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. 
Supp. at 1064–65; Richmond Metro. Auth., 359 F. Supp. at 640–41; Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 
at 739. 
 241  Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. McCoy, 36 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752–53 (N.D. W. Va. 1997); 
MacNamara v. Cty. Council of Sussex Cty., 738 F. Supp. 134, 142 (D. Del. 1990); In re “Agent 
Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 475 F. Supp. at 933–34; Pinkney, 375 F. Supp. at 310–11; Union 
Carbide, 363 F. Supp. at 1064–65; Richmond Metro. Auth., 359 F. Supp. at 640–41; Tanner, 340 F. 
Supp. at 535–37; Envtl. Def. Fund, 325 F. Supp. at 739. 
 242  Concerned Citizens of Neb., 970 F.2d at 427; Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1429–30 
(9th Cir. 1989). 
 243  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1271–72 (D. Or. 2016).  
 244  Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971). 
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right to an environment free of non-natural radiation.”245 Most recently, the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have made clear that constitutional 
environmental rights arising under state constitutions do not create rights under the 
U.S. Constitution.246 
Despite this legal wall of decisions that federal constitutional environmental 
rights do not exist, in 2016 the United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon held in Juliana v. United States that there is a fundamental due process 
right to a stable climate system, because “a stable climate system is a necessary 
condition to exercising other rights to life, liberty, and property.”247 The court was 
careful to limit this newfound constitutional environmental right: 
In framing the fundamental right at issue as the right to a climate system capable of 
sustaining human life, I intend to strike a balance and to provide some protection 
against the constitutionalization of all environmental claims. On the one hand, the 
phrase “capable of sustaining human life” should not be read to require a plaintiff to 
allege that governmental action will result in the extinction of humans as a species. 
On the other hand, acknowledgment of this fundamental right does not transform any 
minor or even moderate act that contributes to the warming of the planet into a 
constitutional violation. In this opinion, this Court simply holds that where a 
complaint alleges governmental action is affirmatively and substantially damaging the 
climate system in a way that will cause human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result 
in widespread damage to property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically 
alter the planet’s ecosystem, it states a claim for a due process violation, To hold 
otherwise would be to say that the Constitution affords no protection against a 
government’s knowing decision to poison the air its citizens breathe or the water its 
citizens drink. Plaintiffs have adequately alleged infringement of a fundamental 
right.248 
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the district court was deciding only a motion 
to dismiss, the Juliana decision has been subject to three years of legal 
maneuvering, with the net result that the district court’s initial legal decisions are 
now on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.249 After 
the District of Oregon denied the government’s motion for interlocutory appeal in 
June 2017,250 the federal government sought mandamus orders to dismiss twice 
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit251 and once from the U.S. 
Supreme Court,252 only to be denied in all three instances.253 In October 2018, the 
 
 245  Concerned Citizens of Neb., 970 F.2d at 426. 
 246  Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 243 F. Supp. 3d 141, 152–53 
(D.D.C. 2017) (holding that environmental rights created under the Pennsylvania Constitution do not 
create federal due process rights), aff’d, 895 F.3d 102, 108–10 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 247  See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250. 
 248  Id. 
 249  Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA, 2018 WL 6303774, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 
2018). 
 250  Id. at *2. 
 251  In re United States, 884 F.3d 830, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2018); In re United States, 895 F.3d 1101, 
1106 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 252  United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., 139 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2018). 
 253  Id.; In re United States, 884 F.3d at 837–38; In re United States, 895 F.3d at 1106. 
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Oregon District Court agreed to dismiss the President as a defendant and concluded 
that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on standing; however, it 
refused to reconsider separation of powers issues and concluded that strict scrutiny 
would apply to the due process claim.254 The court again refused to certify its 
decision for an interlocutory appeal.255 In response to this new decision, the United 
States again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which first stayed the case256 and 
then vacated its own order three weeks later.257 The Ninth Circuit then stepped in 
and stayed the case, inviting the Oregon District Court to revisit its decisions 
regarding an interlocutory appeal, and the district court certified the appeal.258 Oral 
argument in the Ninth Circuit took place on June 4, 2019.259 
One can only conclude from these procedural shenanigans and the federal 
government’s clear unwillingness to let the normal trial and appeal processes play 
themselves out that the prospect of fundamental constitutional rights in the 
environment terrifies the Trump Administration—even though the Juliana case 
might well fail Article III standing. Juliana may well open a new chapter in 
constitutional environmental law. Even if it does not, however, constitutional 
environmental law will continue to generate litigation and scholarship for the 
foreseeable future, helping to articulate the constitutional relationships between and 
among the federal and state governments and their citizens.  
 
 254  Juliana, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1076–80, 1084–96 (D. Or. 2018) (dismissing the President as a 
defendant, refusing to reconsider the separation of powers issues, and precluding summary judgment on 
the standing issue). 
 255  Id. at 1104–05. 
 256  In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 16, 16 (2018). 
 257  In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452, 453 (2018). 
 258  Juliana, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA, 2018 WL 6303774, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2018) (referencing 
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., Case No. 18-73014, Order Dated Nov. 8, 2018 (9th 
Cir. 2018)). 
 259  Unusually, the oral argument was recorded and the broadcast and can be viewed here: 
https://perma.cc/QZ29-UX7X. 
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